SOCKS5 Reconnect re-attached to the session the device already held. It
was the only path where a session began without an ad and without a
nonce binding it to one, and supporting it cost three parameters -
resume, release, resetSupportClaim - plus a carve-out in rule 4 that let
_fetchActiveSession accept whatever nonce the server happened to return.
It also wasn't the kindness it looked like. _handle_main calls
create_or_replace with a fresh full window, so a new session hands the
user *more* time, not less; re-attaching only preserved the remainder of
a session whose proxy had just died.
Reconnect now disconnects and connects again exactly as the button does,
ad included. All four special cases are deleted and the nonce check is
unconditional.
Costs one rewarded ad to repair an orphaned proxy once ads are enabled.
esef's call, and it buys a single way to start a session.
Also fixes the 3.3.7 regression where Reconnect released the session and
then asked for it back: there is no longer a path that does either.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
The client never called /session/stop - the string appears nowhere in
lib/ or local_packages/, on this branch or on main - while the server has
implemented the route all along (hivemind/api.py:237) and AGENTS.md rule
33 documents its ordering. Across a full device test session, two user
disconnects and several expiries, the control plane logged zero calls.
So a disconnect left the VLESS client provisioned in the Reality inbound
and the session dict in memory and sessions.json until its window ran
out. Anyone holding that UUID could keep tunnelling for the remainder.
Users were not locked out of their quota - _handle_main replaces the
session with a fresh full-length one on the next connect - so this is
hygiene rather than a user-facing bug.
Only SessionTimer.disconnect() calls it, which is reached only from the
connect button. Expiry, the hard cap and a server-ended session are
already gone server-side, and the route takes nothing but a device_id as
proof of ownership, so no error path may reach it. Unawaited and capped
at 3 s, so an unreachable API cannot delay the teardown, and every
failure is swallowed: the session expires on its own regardless.
Verified against a mock control plane:
user disconnect POST /api/session/stop -> session removed
expiry no call; alert still posted
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
With ads enabled the SSV nonce and the nonce the connect flow waited for
were minted separately, so the client rejected the very session the ad had
just created and failed with "Session not activated".
- showAd() returns the nonce it put in the SSV custom_data (null on no reward)
- fetchConfigDirectly({adNonce, resume}) replaces skipAdBypass: a real ad
waits for exactly that nonce and polls ~36 s for Google's callback, the
bypass path mints its own, and resume re-attaches to the session the
device already owns
- SOCKS5 "Reconnect" uses resume: true instead of requesting a new session
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Add explicit TUN and SOCKS5 connection modes, app routing controls, authenticated per-session local SOCKS5, Android network monitoring, persistent haptics, resilient session recovery, notification hardening and client-side Hivemind cleanup.
Keep the hosted flutter_vless_android 1.1.5 runtime as the base and apply the Android compatibility/security patches at build time instead of restoring the unstable vendored runtime.
User-Agent spoofed to Chrome on Android (was Dart/3.x). Domain renamed to userevolt.app. Branding to Revolt VPN. Removed duplicate notification, patched flutter_vless for custom icon + dark background. Merged 5 disconnect paths into single idempotent gate, fixed stopVless timeout silently lying about state. Removed kDebugMode guard from AdMob bypass.
